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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The Project, “Fostering evidence-based IWRM in the Stung Pursat Catchment (Tonle 
Sap Great Lake), Cambodia” (also known as MK16) was collaboratively 
implemented by the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology 
(MOWRAM), Tonle Sap Authority (TSA), Supreme National Economic Council 
(SNEC), Hatfield Consultants Partnership (HCP), and Culture and Environment 
Preservation Association (CEPA) between December 2012 to December 2013. The 
MK 16 is an initiative of the Challenge Program for Water and Food (CPWF), 
supported by funding from Australian Aid program. 
MK16 recognizes the strong linkages between research and effective water 
management are required to minimize conflicts and competition that may occur 
between key stakeholders including; irrigated agriculture, hydropower, domestic 
water supply and sanitation, fisheries etc. In addition, MK16 recognizes that 
strategies exist to translate integrated water resources management (IWRM) into 
governance practices. This can be achieved by improving planning and 
management of water resources by taking into account the competition for and 
conflicts over water. Such integrated planning can lead to multi-purpose storage 
reservoirs and other infrastructure projects, water allocation systems, and river 
operations that try to accommodate a wide range of users. 
MK16 is implemented in a single sub-catchment of Tonle Sap basin in western 
Cambodia, the Stung Pursat. The project sought to address and/or improve 
three aspects of water management: (a) cross-sectoral collaboration in the 
management of water resources; (b) use of data or scientific analyses to inform 
water management in Cambodia; and (c) institutional mechanisms for inter-
sectoral management, or interpretation and use of existing or new scientific data. 
1.1 THE CONFLICT/DIFFERENCE AND POWER RELATION ANALYSIS 
The Stakeholder Analysis Report was prepared before the first Multi-Stakeholder 
Platform Meeting which took place in Pursat City on January 24-25, 2013. The 
report was finalized in March 2013. This Report “Conflict/Difference and Power 
Relation Analysis in Pursat Catchment” builds on the stakeholder analysis report. 
The MK16 report analyses stakeholder roles, relationships, and views on water 
resources management in Cambodia in general, and Pursat specifically, for 
developing good IWRM structures that incorporates a shared understanding of 
the reality and complexity of different stakeholder interests and relationships. The 
analysis is designed to examine the degree of consistency or disparity between 
different stakeholders, and between formal stakeholder roles and actual practices.  
The Conflict/Difference and Power Relation Analysis in Pursat Catchment 
addresses the following research questions: 
1. What are the key stakeholder roles, relationships, and perceptions in 
existing water governance arrangements, and how consistent are 
these perceptions among different stakeholders at different levels? 
2. What are the consistencies and inconsistencies between formal 
stakeholder roles and actual practices? 
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2.0 METHOD FOR CONFLICT AND POWER RELATION 
ANALYSIS 
The analysis was built on the stakeholder typology described in the Stakeholder 
Analysis Report (March 2013) that differentiated possible groups or actors that: 
consume resource(s)/control the site; benefit from the use of 
resource(s)/targeted schemes; have rights and responsibilities over the use and 
management of the targeted resource(s)/schemes; and have decision making 
power. 
Figure 1 Tonle Sap Stakeholders at Various Scales. 
 
This above structure was used to develop a stakeholder typology, determine 
power relative positions, identify existing capacity for MSP and identify 
requirements for strengthening participatory IWRM in Pursat specifically and 
Cambodia generally. 
2.1 STAKEHOLDER TYPOLOGY 
Table 1 and Table 2 below summarizes and briefly describes major stakeholders, 
grouped according to stakeholder type (e.g., resource users/primary 
stakeholders and regulators/secondary stakeholders). 
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Table 1 Pursat Stakeholder Mapping – Primary Stakeholders. 
No Resource Users/ Primary Stakeholders Description of Roles and Challenges 
1 Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) 
Farmer Water User Communities 
(FWUC) 
16 FWUCs were created (with license from MOWRAM) and under technical support by Pursat PDOWRAM and the Agriculture Department 
(MAFF). However, only 5 are functioning with support from ADB projects. Their roles are to coordinate local water users and farmers, provide 
operation and management/maintenance of secondary irrigation systems with support from PDOWRAM, and the collection and 
administration of irrigation services fees. 11 established FWUCs ceased to function in the absence of sustained support from MOWRAM.  
MOWRAM and PDWROM need to mobilize human or financial resources to meet their commitments to the FWUC agreement (including 
financial support for the initial five years for operation, repair and maintenance of damaged or deteriorated infrastructure, etc.). There are not 
enough capable staff in MOWRAM’s FWUC department to provide the follow-up training needed to keep FWUCs motivated and active. 
Commune Councils (which are now legally responsible for all infrastructure within their communes under the new Organic Law) have some 
funds which could be used to repair irrigation facilities, but they are not yet authorized to exercise this role within MOWRAM’s structures and 
systems (CTDA, 2013).  
Fisheries Communities  Pursat has the second richest biodiversity among 12 catchments around Tonle Sap Lake, with an estimated 100 fish species (second only to 
Stung Sen in Kampong Thom; FiA, 2013. Personal Communication with Mr. Chhen Phen, Phnom Penh, Cambodia). Pursat is known for its 
deep pools and varied fish habitat. There are approximately 34 fisheries communities in Pursat province (8,101 households). There are also 
numerous other individuals that depend on fishing, but are not members of these communities. Most of these communities are located in the 
most downstream parts of Pursat, next to Tonle Sap Lake. 
Community Forests Community forests are state forests subject to an agreement between the cantonment of the Forest Administration and local communities or 
an organized group of people, to manage and utilize the forest in a sustainable manner. Community forestry is initiated and promoted mainly 
by the various international NGOs, donor agencies, national NGOs, CSOs, and of late by the Royal Government of Cambodia. Community 
forestry only exists at the local level in pilot provinces, as part of various projects. However, these community forests have very limited 
capacity (expertise/knowledge), receive high inputs from NGOs, are not integrated with other sectors (such as agriculture), have limited 
extension-research linkages, and their importance is insufficiently reflected in institutional structures.  
Current work is characterized by: emphasis on highly degraded forests, rehabilitation work, use of Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs) for 
livelihood improvement (but commercial use of timber is not yet considered), integrated approaches such as the community-based natural 
resources management (CBNRM), limited benefit sharing arrangements, and improving integration with local structures. According to 
Forestry Administration (http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/ad511e/ad511e0a.htm), there are 31 forest communities in 5 districts (11 communes) 
of Pursat. 
2 4/5 Districts are within the Pursat 
Catchment 
There are 23/82 communes and 248/503 villages in the Pursat province, located in Pursat catchment. In Damnak Ampil Irrigation System, 
there are two main communes namely Bac Chhonchean (upstream of reservoir) and Loloksar (downstream). Loloksar has 10 villages 
comprising about 1,855 households and 8,875 people (on average about 4-5 people/household). Bac Chhonchean has 6 villages comprising 
about 1,315 households and 6,267 people (MOP, 2011). The province contains a total of about 1,674 ha of rainy season paddy field (on 
average, about 1.3ha per household; Chief of Bac Chhonchean commune, 2013). 
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Table 1 (Cont’d.) 
No Resources Users/ Primary Stakeholders Description of Roles and Challenges 
 Upstream communities Tension between upstream and downstream communities manifest in different ways: 
1. Tension arises when upstream communities close irrigation gates for water withdrawal. This results in a reaction from downstream 
communities worried this activity may impact their ability to meet irrigation requirements. To avoid conflict better collaboration through, 
for example, an agreement on water allocation, adapting timing and farming calendar; and 
2. In the dry season, most downstream communities (below national highway 5) face water shortages and turbid water, due to low flows, 
upstream diversions, and inter-sub-basin diversions (e.g. from Pursat to Svay Don Keo). 
Downstream communities 
Communities living adjacent to the 
project sites 
Using Damnak Ampil reservoir as an example, the two communes – Roloksor (downstream) and Bac Chhonchean (upstream) – face similar 
challenges. These include reservoir water inundating river-bank gardens and paddy fields, and restricted access to water (for paddy fields 
which are higher than the water surface level) due to the high costs of pumping water. Affected communities at the Dam 3 and Dam 5 project 
sites have been waiting for the implementation of the resettlement plan and land compensation, pending decision from the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance (Personal communication of Phnum Kravanh District Governor, 2013). 
3 Hydropower developers  
China Funding ($66Million) 
Korng Dong Construction Company 
China has become a leading grant and soft loan provider in Cambodia, and in Pursat. Pursat 3 and 5 are in an advanced stage of 
development (20% construction completion expected in the next 2-3 years). Pursat 3 storage capacity will be about 25.5 MCM, and Pursat 5 
will be about 24.5 MCM. Some villages were subject to involuntary resettlement. 
Korean company conducting pre-
feasibility study with China as a 
potential developer.  
The Pursat 1 dam feasibility study is being conducted by a Korean Company. Three options for the dam location and designs were proposed. 
Alternative 2 appears to be the leading contender, with an effective storage capacity of 992.5 MCM with an installed capacity of 40-70MW. 
MOWRAM included Pursat Dam 1 in its Basin Development Plan produced by K-Water in 2008. MOWRAM inputs included development for 
both hydro-electric generation and irrigation. However, this was abandoned for the hydropower alternative studied by Korean Company for 
MIME as a single purpose dam.   
Japan Funding JICA has been heavily involved in Cambodia in many sectors (water, irrigation, road and bridge, and education etc.). In Pursat, JICA is 
supporting irrigation improvement in Western Tonle Sap. It is divided into 3 sub-projects for irrigation rehabilitation and improvement in Bang 
Knar (tributary of Pursat), Wat Chre, and Wat Luong. 
4 Sand-mine developers  
Three major sand mining operators There are three medium scale operators in the upper stretches of the river, in Kravanh District and Pursat Town. There are concerns about 
changes in morphological conditions from downstream communities, particularly related to increased turbidity caused by disturbances to the 
riverbed and potential changes in flow direction and velocity, and about proper monitoring of mining activities and the license approval 
process.   
 + numerous smaller sand mining groups are waiting for licensing.   
5 Private companies Pursat is attracting many private companies that are investing in the agriculture sector; companies have purchased 800-100 hectares of land. 
Major crops include rice, sugar palm, sweet potatoes, sesame, beans, mixed vegetables, corn and cassava. In total, there are about 1,000 
private enterprises in Pursat, including manufacturing industries, ice factories, drinking water companies, soft drink producer, and horticulture. 
6 Plantation and economic land 
concession 
Parts of Pursat province have been allocated to a range of concessions (agricultural concessions, economic land concessions and social 
concessions; as well as mining exploration leases and possibly exploitation agreements)1. 
                                                     
1 A very large land concession allocated to Pheapimex located in the lowlands to the north and east of Phnom Aural. 
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Table 2 Pursat Stakeholder Mapping – Secondary Stakeholders. 
No Resources Regulator/ Secondary Stakeholders Description of Roles 
1 Inter-governmental Resettlement 
Committee 
RGC established the Inter-Ministerial Resettlement Committee (IRC) in 2007 consisting of permanent members within the MEF as a way to 
overcome land resettlement issues that have caused major delays in project implementation in Cambodia over the past years (MEF SOP, 
2012). The IRC in turn is supported by a newly created Resettlement Department within the MEF. Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) and ADB are supporting the Resettlement Department by providing training and other forms of logistical support. The role of the 
Resettlement Department (RD) in MEF is to assist line Ministries to prepare well-structured resettlement plans and to have these plans funded 
and executed. Resettlement Units may be created within Ministries that are assigned to execute development projects (MEF and MOWRAM for 
Dams 3 and 5 in Pursat). 
IRC generally uses the guidelines of major Development Partners (DPs) to formulate land resettlement plans. It is the responsibility of the IRC 
to develop resettlement plans jointly with the Implementing Agency/Executing Agencies (IA/EA), and to ensure that they are executed to the 
satisfaction of both the RGC and the DPs. However, Dams 3 and 5 were funded by Chinese bilateral funding, and were implemented although 
the issue of resettlement remains unsolved. Sub-groups of this Inter-ministerial Resettlement Committee at the provincial and district levels 
implement resettlement plans after the Committee approved them. There is a policy on involuntary resettlement which is a formal requirement. 
A Resettlement Plan for implementation is required, assets are compensated at replacement cost (although this can be difficult to calculate) 
and there is special assistance to vulnerable groups (female and disable headed households). Further, monitoring and evaluation is performed 
by both internal and external monitors and a grievance redress mechanism has been established. 
2 Ministry of Economy and Finance MEF provides guidance and administration to the Government of Cambodia on all critical economic and financial issues. MEF’s mandate is to 
support economic development and improve living standards of Cambodians based on the principles of a free market economy and social 
equality.  
MEFs main functions and duties of interest to this project include:  
 To promote good governance related to administrative aspects of economy and public finance; 
 To allocate and re-allocate national revenues through the collection of income and programming and budgeting of public expenses;  
 To prepare draft laws and regulations; 
 To participate in lobbying for aid and the preparation of plans for borrowing and paying foreign loans, and to follow-up and to monitor the 
performance of such plans; and 
 To manage and control public procurement transactions of the ministries/institutions, provinces/municipalities, and state-managed or 
autonomous institutions. 
The MEF, through its Resettlement Department, supports and runs an Inter-Ministerial Committee (IRC) with permanent members within the 
MEF (MEF SOP, 2012).  
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Table 2 (Cont’d.) 
No Resources Regulator/ Secondary Stakeholders Description of Roles 
3 Ministry of Water Resources and 
Meteorology (MOWRAM)  
MOWRAM’s main functions and duties of interest to this project include: 
 Define policies and develop strategies for water resources;  
 Research and investigations into water resources;  
 Prepare plans for water resources development and conservation;  
 Manage direct and indirect water resource use, and mitigate water-related disasters;  
 Draft water legislation and regulations and monitor  implementation and enforcement ; 
 Gather and manage data on surface water, groundwater, and meteorology;  
 Provide technical advice; and  
 Administer international collaborations, including those within the Mekong River basin. 
MOWRAM has been preparing a sub-decree on procedures describing the; Establishment, Dissolution, Roles and Obligations of Farmer Water 
User Communities (FWUCs), a sub-decree on river basin management (RBM), and two sub-decrees (licensing/water allocation and water 
quality). The adoption of RBM into law will certainly lead to a broader look at river basin management in many key catchments, and potentially 
can be a good entry point for our outcomes from this study to be used. 
In Pursat Basin, MOWRAM is regulating and implementing multi-purpose reservoirs (e.g. Dam 3 and 5 which are now being implemented), and 
through provincial departments (PDOWRAM), operating and managing reservoirs and main irrigation canals; providing support to the Farmer 
and Water Users Communities (FWUCs), and approving and monitoring sand mining activities. MOWRAM is searching for possible 
mechanisms to improve coordination and information sharing with MIME in designing and operating cascade of dams and water diversion. 
MOWRAM and MAFF are jointly responsible for the development and implementation of the Strategy for Agriculture and Water (SAW). 
Tonle Sap Authority (TSA) The Tonle Sap Authority is an Inter-Ministerial and Agencies Coordination body for the Tonle Sap Basin. Its main mission is to coordinate the 
management, protection, conservation and development of water and other related resources in the Mekong River basin. Similar to other 
National Mekong Committees of Mekong River Commission (MRC) Member countries that play critical roles in the effective implementation of 
1995 Mekong Agreement and preparation and implementation of other related MRC projects and programmes. TSA draws its members from 
the sub-national level and from relevant National Agencies. Its geographic scope is limited to the Tonle Sap Basin located within the National 
Roads 5 and 6. Its role in coordination for the whole Tonle Sap may be worth revisiting. 
4 Ministry of Industry, Mines and 
Energy (MIME)  
MIME’s main functions and duties of interest to this project include: 
 Formulates policy, strategy and planning for the industrial, mining, and power sectors, and urban and city water supply authorities;  
 Provides water supply to provincial towns;  
 Drafts policies and strategies on urban water supply and sanitation; and  
 Administration of hydropower projects whose main objective is electricity generation. 
In Pursat Basin, MIME is regulating and implementing single purpose hydropower dams (e.g. Pursat 1 [currently in the advanced pre-feasibility 
stage] and Pursat 2). MIME is searching for a proper mechanism for co-approval of sand-mining licenses.   
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Table 2 (Cont’d.) 
No Resources Regulator/ Secondary Stakeholders Description of Roles 
5 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishery (MAFF) 
MAFF’s main functions and duties of interest to this project include: 
 Participate in the preparation of land reform and utilization policies; 
 Establish agriculture sector development plans;  
 Co-ordinate monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of policies and activities for agriculture development;  
 Propose legislation and regulations related to the management, maintenance and protection of natural resources in the agriculture sector, 
and monitor implementation;  
 Evaluate and develop human resources required for agriculture development by increasing technical skills and know-how, and ensure 
effective use of these human resources;  
 Support and advise farmers on technologies to increase productivity;  
 Establish guiding principles and monitor implementation to enhance and improve involvement of relevant professional organizations and 
associations involved in the agriculture sector;  
 Provide advice on agricultural land development, soil quality improvements and appropriate utilization of land, seeds, breeds, fertilizers, 
chemicals appropriate for different environmental and climatic conditions to increase yields and environmental sustainability;  
 Co-ordinate and co-operate with internal and external organizations and NGOs involved in agricultural development;  
 Develop policies and strategies for agriculture, forestry and fisheries related to the management of water resources; and  
 Manage forests (which have relevance to the condition of watersheds, hydrological regimes and water quality).  
MOWRAM and MAFF are jointly responsible for the development and implementation of the Strategy for Agriculture and Water (SAW). 
Forestry Administration (FA) The FA manages forests and forest resources according to the National Forestry Sector Policy and the Forestry Law to ensure 
sustainable management of forests throughout Cambodia. In Pursat, the FA undertook inventories of NTFPs at the district level, managed 
exploitation of annual timber harvestings, and supported the villagers especially where community-protected areas are established. 
Fisheries Administration (FiA) The Fisheries Administration implements the RGC National Fisheries Sector Policy for sustainable fisheries resource management and 
development to contribute to achieving greater food security and socio-economic development. It works with other government agencies and 
development partners to integrate fisheries management and development activities into development plans of relevant institutions, including 
government’s ministries, development partners, NGOs and communities (commune development plans). 
At a sub-national level, FiA provides technical support to community fisheries development. In Pursat, FiA conducted studies on fish species. 
These studies indicated that there were approximately 100 different species in Pursat River and some critical deep-pool and fish habitats 
(including specific tree species required for healthy fish habitats). It seeks collaboration with MOWRAM and MIME for inclusion of assessments 
related to dam and irrigation system developments. FiA also provides technical support to the fisheries communities. 
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Table 2 (Cont’d.) 
No Resources Regulator/ Secondary Stakeholders Description of Roles 
6 Ministry of Public Works and 
Transport (MPWT)  
MPWT’s main functions and duties of interest to our project include: 
 Manage the implementation of national policies concerning public works construction; 
 Build, maintain and manage all transportation infrastructure such as roads, bridges, ports, railways, waterways and buildings; 
 Establish regulations for the development and management of roads, ports, railways and waterways infrastructure; 
 Establish regulations and controls for transportation by road, railway and waterway; 
 Contribute to the establishment of laws, regulations, diverse standards related to the construction of transport infrastructure; and 
 Study, survey and construct river works for navigation and water transport. 
7 Ministry of Rural Development The Ministry of Rural Development’s main functions and duties of interest to our project include: 
 Coordinate, cooperate, implement, monitor and evaluate rural development projects and programs (including water related projects for rural 
development), in order to rehabilitate and help develop rural areas by assisting the local populations. 
 Coordinate the operational activities of various line ministries and assistance programs. 
 Undertake independent research initiatives to develop rural areas in Cambodia by liaising widely, in order to assess needs and investigate 
possible solutions to optimize identified opportunities, etc. 
 Conduct hydrogeological research, data collection and archiving. 
 Provide water supply, sanitation, land drainage in rural areas. 
 Draft policies and strategies on rural water supply and sanitation. 
8 Ministry of Environment (MoE)  MoE’s main functions and duties of interest to our project include: 
 Promote environmental protection and conservation of natural resources throughout the country. 
 Contribute to improving environmental quality, public welfare, national culture and the economy.  
 Facilitate the development and implementation of policies, plans and legal instruments to promote and ensure the rational use and 
management and sustainability of the country's natural resources. 
 Support public participation in decision-making to resolve environmental and natural resource use issues. 
9 Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
(MOWA) 
In 1999, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA) published its first Five Year Strategy, Neary Ratanak I (Women are precious gems) and this 
strategy was incorporated into the second national Socio-Economic Development Plan (SED II). The overall aim of this strategy is to create a 
new reality for Cambodian women, moving from a disadvantaged group to a valuable asset and one with great social and economic potential. 
The MOWA seeks to remove access barriers to natural resources such as land, water, energy and information and to assist women with 
playing a greater role in the economy and to ensure they benefit from the fruits of their labor in all sectors. 
10 Ministry of Interior MoI has jurisdiction over provincial and district levels of government, the Department of Local Administration (DOLA), and Provincial Offices of 
Local Administration (POLA), and is also responsible for assigning and managing the commune clerks. MOI is a powerful ministry in charge of both 
police forces and administration of sub-national authorities. All governors of the provinces and municipalities are accountable to the MOI. The 
salaries of the local-elected bodies (communes and Sangkat) are paid through the MOI payroll. The chief of villages – lowest administrative level – 
that work directly with the villagers are appointed by MOI.  MOI leads the implementation of the Strategic Framework on Decentralization and 
Deconcentration that the Royal Government adopted on 17 June 2005, and the Organic Law. It is a major policy document that proposes the 
restructuring and reformation of all current levels of sub-national administration. These levels consist of provinces, municipalities, districts, khan, 
communes and sangkat. These local democratic processes will need to be reviewed and considered as they need to develop synergies with 
community-based organizations and river basin committees led by other sector ministries. 
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Table 2 (Cont’d.) 
No Resources Regulator/ Secondary Stakeholders Description of Roles 
11 Ministry of Planning The Ministry of Planning is responsible for development of commune development planning procedures and assists with village planning and 
village interactions with communes. The Ministry provides inputs into any rules and regulations related to the role of villages in decentralized 
governance. 
12 Provincial Rural Development 
Committee (PRDC) 
PRDC provides an important collaboration and coordination role between various line ministries and government institutions, the private sector, 
civil society and national/international donor agencies as they relate to the planning and management of development at the provincial level. 
The PRDC is composed of the provincial governor, deputy governor, directors of the departments of Rural Development and Planning, directors 
from technical departments, and district chiefs. The execution of annual work plans and budgets of the PRDC, or what can be considered the 
day-to-day work of the PRDC, is carried out by an executive committee (ExCom). The ExCom is made up, at a minimum, of the governor, 
deputy governor, directors from the departments of Rural Development, Planning, Economy and Finance, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
Water Resources and Meteorology, Women’s and Veterans’ Affairs, the director of the provincial treasury, and the chief of the Local 
Administration Unit (LAU). 
13 ADB ADB’s Country Partnership Strategy 2011-2013 focused on two strategic objectives: (i) “inclusive economic growth, through physical 
infrastructure, TVET, agriculture and irrigation, financial sector development, regional integration, private sector development, and economic 
diversification; and (ii) social development and equity, through basic education, water supply and sanitation, social protection measures, and 
community-based development around the Tonle Sap.” The CPS identifies four cross-cutting themes or challenges for Cambodia’s 
development process: (i) Environment and climate change; (ii) Decentralization; (iii)Urban-rural links; and (iv) Regional cooperation 
Civil Society Organizations NGOs, research and educational institutes (CEDAC, CAVAC, CDRI, RUPP, ITC, RUA), others 
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2.2 MAPPING STAKEHOLDER INFLUENCE AND SENSITIVITY 
Figure 2 describes the characteristics of stakeholders, and the benefits and risks 
plotted on two axis; 1) Level of influence, and 2) Sensitivity to impacts. These 
two axis are used to place different stakeholders according to the level of 
influence or power over the system and their sensitivity to changes in the 
system. The value of such a typology lies in providing insights into the relative 
positions of stakeholders in water governance and management.  
Figure 2 Initial Stakeholders Relation Mapping for Pursat. 
 
It is important to understand the complexity of: interests and motivations; power 
relations; evaluations and predictions of impacts; and, human capacity 
assessments, and their comparative influence (power) and interests (extent of 
being affected) within this system. The Figure above shows a complex landscape 
that includes a wide range of public, private and community level actors. The y- 
(or vertical) axis ranges from highly sensitive groups to those who stand to most 
benefit. Groups with low and high influence are found on left and right side of 
the horizontal axis, respectively. There are multiple claims on water as a shared 
resource and multiple levels of authority when managing and making decisions 
regarding water resource development and allocations. The classification of 
stakeholders into levels of influence, and levels of sensitively to impacts (or 
levels of potential benefit), allowed the project team to develop steps to support 
the most impacted groups (some of which have been overlooked) and to work 
closely with those “most influential” groups to bring to their attention various 
legitimate concerns from communities and other groups.  
The initial stakeholder relation map shows that those who are in the best 
position to influence the decision-making process include: 1) Head of the 
Government, and some key Ministers – MEF, Resettlement Committee, 
MOWRAM, MIME, MPWT, and MRD: 2) Developers (national and foreign, 
especially those from China, and Korea): 3) Asian Development Bank, Japan 
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Funding institutions: and, 4) Land concession owners, mining companies etc. 
Hydropower projects in Cambodia attract investment from different companies 
including; foreign private companies, foreign state own companies, and joint 
ventures between local and foreign companies (MK4, 2013). Hydropower 
projects in Pursat are being developed or planned under Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) agreements that will operate for 25 years or more2. Some domestic private 
developers and investors have greater influence due to their position, having 
political alliances with top-decision-makers, being a member of the Senate, 
and/or being a financier or developer of the projects or concessions.  
Some water and environment related agencies have called for a mechanism to 
improve cross-sectoral coordination between different water users (for 
hydropower, irrigation, mining, tourism and rural development) to minimize 
the potential for being sidelined or by-passed. For example, the Fisheries 
Administration said their fisheries interests were not adequately considered, and 
that they were not adequately involved in decision-making. MOWRAM felt that 
they were not adequately involved to ensure irrigation benefits would be 
considered in hydropower dam design and development etc. (MSP1, 2013).  
The preliminary stakeholder relationship map shows that those who are most 
vulnerable to impacts/change do not have enough say in decision-making. The 
relationship map illustrates that some stakeholders, like foreign investors from 
China, India, etc. may exercise a high level of influence on the system, but have 
low sensitivity to the changes that occur in a system, and in fact reap high 
benefits from those changes. This is in contrast to the highly sensitive 
downstream communities or poor people that are very vulnerable to the changes 
in the system, but have no or limited say in the decision-making system. Local 
communities at the project sites are involuntary risk takers, and the developers 
are taking calculated risk in investing in hydropower or irrigation development. 
The key question is how to make the investment and development cost 
incorporate all relevant costs, and minimize the externality costs that have to be 
shouldered by the local communities. 
Existing community-based organizations such as Farmers and Water Users 
Communities, Forestry Communities, and Fisheries Communities, cannot 
perform as expected, and often find that they have very little power. It was 
reported that out of 16 Farmer Water Users’ Community (FWUC), only 5 are 
operational. These are sustained through funding from various development 
bank projects. This raises the concern about the sustainability of FWUC and/or 
of any MSP in the long run (Minutes of MSP 1, 2013).  
It is interesting to observe that the elected local authority (Commune Councils) 
are not included in the group that have decision-making authority but are 
potentially vulnerable to being voted out of the office by voters. Key decision-
makers such as Ministers and other high ranking officials seem somewhat 
immune from being voted out by voters. This is consistent with the challenges 
associated with decentralization (re-distributing power from national to local 
levels of governance), deconcentration (distributing power across various 
government, non-government and community stakeholders) and local 
                                                     
2 http://www.investincambodia.com/power.htm 
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democratization (through direct election of commune councils) of governance. 
How will seemingly parallel forms of governance related to water (fisheries, 
forestry, irrigation, RBC, etc.) engage with each other since they are created 
and regulated by different national agencies and sub-national sector agencies?  
The position held by NGOs and academia in this power and risk sharing 
relationship is interesting. Currently they have been rated as less influential and 
less vulnerable players. From our observation, the NGO/CSOs can hold more 
policy influence if particular processes are secured and maintained, e.g. through 
closer partnership with the key LAs, and developers, and if they possess 
adequate capacity (financial, technical, resources and personnel with right 
aptitude and skills). There is still a misperception about the role of CSOs among 
some key officials and CSOs leaders. It is important to work towards a higher 
level of acceptance of multi-stakeholder communications and providing an 
effective space for information exchange (Pech in MK4, 2013). Experience shows 
that CSOs need to work closely with influential institutions to achieve greater 
influence in getting reluctant Line Ministries to become more involved (Pech in 
MK4, 2013). The position/role of NGOs’ and academia can be changed 
depending on their ability and opportunity to play an active role and on their 
trust in constructively promoting the many dimensions related to collective 
action. This may involve diverse actors working together, supporting local 
communities, leveling playing fields, negotiating outcomes, and sometimes 
addressing conflicts around water resources.  
The analysis also confirms our hypothesis that the practices of different 
stakeholders and the relationships between them are often a departure from 
established formal arrangements. It is therefore important to examine the degree 
of consistency or disparity in two key dimensions: between different 
stakeholders, and between formal stakeholder roles and actual practices. 
3.0 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
3.1 FORMAL ROLES AND ACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS OF KEY 
STAKEHOLDERS IN EXISTING WATER GOVERNANCE 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Administrative arrangements in Cambodia are currently divided into national 
and sub-national levels. Figure 3 illustrates various stakeholders at the national 
and subnational levels. It also shows that most ministries and agencies in 
Cambodia have provincial- and district-level offices that should allow them to 
interact closely with the local communities that they are supposed to serve. 
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Figure 3 Schematic illustration of National and Sub-National Levels of Power in 
Cambodia (Pech, 2010). 
 
Currently, interactions and communications between central ministries, local 
authorities and agencies, and with local communities is primarily top-down. A 
gap therefore exists in feed-back communications, a situation which is rarely 
effective for establishing effective communication and coordination. Such poor 
interaction and participation may be caused by a lack of capacity, in mutual 
trust, and in resources allocated from the national to sub-national levels (World 
Bank and ADB, 2006). 
With respect to the Pursat catchment, the Cambodia National Mekong 
Committee (CNMC), and Tonle Sap Authority, chaired by MOWRAM, are key 
inter-governmental committees and are intended to provide linkages among 
relevant ministries and agencies at national and provincial levels. In addition 
there are also inter-ministerial coordination committees, including the Inter-
Ministerial Resettlement Committee based in the Resettlement Department of 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and other inter-agencies committees and 
bodies dealing with local democratization (deconcentration and 
decentralization) housed within the Ministry of Interior.  
There are instances of jurisdictional overlap between ministries and lack of 
adequate communication between coordinating committees/bodies at the 
national and sub-national levels. These bodies are often housed and coordinated 
by different national agencies. These overlaps and communication gaps have 
impacts at the national, provincial, district and ultimately commune levels of the 
government, creating uncertainty and inefficiency within the realm of service 
delivery and local planning (CDRI, 2009). 
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For example, the MOI is a powerful ministry in charge of administration of sub-
national authorities, and leads the implementation of the Strategic Framework on 
Decentralization and Deconcentration. The Framework proposes restructuring of 
existing levels of sub-national administration. These levels consist of provintial, 
municipal, district, khan, commune and sangkat. The National Committee for 
Support (NCS) is chaired by the Minister of Interior and co-chaired by the 
minister in charge of the Council of Ministers. It has ministerial level 
representation from MEF, MRD, MLUPC, MoP and MWVA. The Department of 
Local Administration, MOI, acts as the secretariat to the NCS. MOWRAM 
appears absent in this NCS. 
The local democratic processes described above requires review and 
recommendations to develop better synergies with community-based 
organizations and river basin committees led by other sector ministries (such as 
FWUCs and RBC procedures led by MOWRAM and supported by MAFF).  
A case in point is there is not enough capable staff and resources in MOWRAM’s 
FWUC Department to provide follow-up training needed to keep FWUCs 
motivated and active. The Commune Councils (which are now legally 
responsible, under the new Organic Law, for all infrastructure within their 
communes) have some funds which could be used to repair irrigation facilities, if 
they are authorized to exercise this role in relation to MOWRAM’s structures 
and systems (CTDA, 2013). 
There are also other cases of jurisdictional division and overlap between 
MOWRAM and MIME. MIME regulates single-purpose hydropower dams and 
MOWRAM regulates multi-purpose dams and irrigation systems. This division 
may hamper a stronger synergy and promotion of multi-purpose systems in the 
catchment, and hinders optimization of development, operation and 
maintenance of these water infrastructures and systems (MSP1, 2013). 
There are also 5 district levels of government in Pursat. The various line ministries 
have district level offices, with the district chief playing a coordinating role. 
District chief and line ministry district offices largely operate based on direct 
instructions from the province, with little autonomous authority. The newly 
elected commune councils and associated structures represent the current 
system at the commune level. As commune chiefs create various administrative 
committees, the various line ministries are supposed to delegate agency 
functions to commune councils, and additional staff members are to be hired to 
carry out added responsibilities. 
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Figure 4 Schematic illustration of sectoral/single project decision-making 
processes in Cambodia and Pursat. 
 
Figure 4 shows the current planning and assessment processes for major 
projects. Each hydropower, irrigation, navigation, forest/land use, transport or 
infrastructure development proponent undertakes their own environmental and 
social impact assessment that includes discrete elements such as noise, air, soil, 
surface water, ground water etc., and in a format preferred by them or their 
investment banks and as per requirements described in Cambodian laws and 
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regulations. The Master Plan for Tonle Sap or Pursat are not available, and the 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) or cumulative impact assessment 
(CIA) have not yet been conducted. In brief, the impact of any qualified 
development project on the environment and community is primarily studied 
using sectoral environmental impact assessment (EIA) instruments and sectoral 
decision-making that result development of sectoral or single project decision 
making, mitigation, management and monitoring plans.  
3.2 REGULATIONS, LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
EIA’s are governed by the 1996 Law on Environmental Protection and Natural 
Resources Management (Chapter 3 – EIA) and EIA Process Sub-decree of 1999. 
The law and its sub-decrees have been in force for over a decade, enforcement 
and compliance are limited.3  
Screening requirements specifying projects requiring either an initial 
environmental examination (IEE) or full-scale assessment are contained as an 
Annex to the 1999 Sub-Decree. Projects that exceed certain thresholds (i.e., 
projects exceeding a certain size, all factories, hydropower projects more than 1 
megawatt in size, mining projects, large hotels, roads over 100 km and land 
concessions over 10,000 hectares, among others) must complete and receive 
approval for an EIA before commencing work. However, there is no clear 
guidance on criteria by which a full EIA is deemed necessary. 
A draft EIA report must be submitted by project proponents for approval by the 
Ministry of Environment, before the proponents can apply for investment 
approval from the Council for Development of Cambodia (CDC) and/or 
receiving project approval by the government. In this sense, the Cambodian EIA 
process covers only the project preparation phase. Limited capacity within 
Cambodia exists to prepare credible EIAs. The Department of EIA Review 
within the Ministry of Environment, is constrained both by insufficient staff 
capacity and size to manage the review of large EIAs within the 30-day period 
stipulated in the sub-decree; and some decision-makers view the need for a 
project’s compliance with the EIA process as secondary to the need for rapid 
economic development in Cambodia (Middleton, 2008; Li, 2008). Another 
challenge lies in broadening EIA procedures to increasingly include assessment 
of the social aspects of environmental decisions, as well as cumulative and 
regional impacts (SEA, CIA, SIA etc.).  
The role of sub-national authorities and communities is limited to participating 
in the consultation conducted during the EIA stage. Local civil society 
organizations and some government agencies have complained about the lack of 
meaningful participation and consultation on impact assessments, and lack of 
access to the results of Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) of 
major projects.  
                                                     
3 Cambodia Daily, 2013 at http://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/few-companies-conduct-environmental-studies-6288/ . 
Speaking at a workshop in Phnom Penh on a new draft Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) law, Danh Serey, 
deputy director of the ministry’s EIA department, said existing legislation was not strong or enforced well enough to 
ensure companies conduct the necessary environmental checks before starting work. Only about 5 percent of the 
roughly 2,000 major development projects, such as dams, roads and bridges, approved by the government between 
2004 and 2011 carried out environmental impact assessments. 
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In 2007, the RGC established an Inter-Ministerial Resettlement Committee (IRC) 
with permanent members within the MEF. For many years, land resettlement 
issues have been a major cause of delay in project implementation in Cambodia 
(MEF SOP, 2012). IRC generally uses guidelines of major Development Partners 
to formulate land resettlement plans. It is the responsibility of the IRC to develop 
resettlement plans jointly with the IA/EA, and to ensure that they are executed 
to the satisfaction of both the RGC and the DPs. However, dams funded in 
Pursat are mainly financed using bilateral funding. There is a policy on 
involuntary resettlement which proponents are required to follow. An 
implementable resettlement plan is required, assets should be compensated at 
replacement cost (although this can be difficult to calculate) and special 
assistance should be provided to vulnerable groups (female and disable headed 
households). Further, monitoring and evaluation must be performed by both 
internal and external monitors and a grievance redress mechanism established. 
Sub-groups of this Inter-ministerial Resettlement Committee at the provincial 
and district levels are involved mainly in implementing the resettlement plans 
after the committee has approved them. 
A case study conducted by the Royal University of Phnom Penh (Kimkong, 
2007) recommended that ESIA’s should not be conducted immediately prior to 
the start of a project. ESIA and environmental mitigation management plans 
should also be made public during early stages of project planning and design, 
and communities likely to be affected by the project must be informed (Kimkong 
2007). They also recommended that the financial arrangements used to 
implement these plans, together with the roles and responsibilities of 
implementing agencies be provided. The study also pointed to the absence of 
conflict resolution mechanisms for managing conflicts between local residents 
and dam builders/operators. Guidelines and mechanisms should be created in 
order to deal with trans-boundary (administrative, cross-sectoral or cross 
political boundary) issues/conflicts and compensation. The practice proved to be 
fragmented and incapable of dealing with subjects that cut across sectors or river 
basin management themes; this normally led to incomplete and inaccurate 
assessment of project impacts.  
4.0 MSP CAPACITY 
4.1 MSP CAPACITY ASSESSMENT 
The capacity of primary and secondary stakeholders to participate in multi-
stakeholder platforms was assessed during the project inception phase and 
during field work.  
Data collection focused on social capacity/capital and its two dimensions, 
namely structure: policy, laws and institutional forms; and capacity: the 
knowledge, skills, and processes by which government staff and community 
members participate in water governance issues, especially leaders of 
community-based organizations (Ashwal et al. 2011). There are formal legal and 
policy frameworks to support local decision-making within relevant sub-
national governments, such as provincial, district and village authorities; elected 
commune council; sub-national sectoral departments and offices; as well as 
numerous community-based natural resources users’ organizations (Pech 2010). 
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Institutional and capacity issues are present at both the national and sub-
national levels.  
4.2 STRENGTHENING MSP CAPACITY: BARRIERS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 
While it is true that a structure is only as good as the people working in it, and 
that any structure can be rendered ineffective by poor management, a 
dysfunctional structure is also a contributing factor to (poor) management 
performance. At the national level, much could be done to move forward from 
the current lack of horizontal coordination between Cambodian sectoral 
ministries and the excessively top-down approach between various levels of 
government (central, provincial and local). Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of a 
proposed mechanism for improving coordination during development of 
‘national vision and positions’ and for coordinating the implementation of 
international commitments. 
Figure 5 Strengthening institutional links at the national level to contribute to 
better management of international relations. 
 
The process of aligning various interests, commonly referred to as ’governance’, 
is the responsibility government agencies, and should take into account the 
interests of key stakeholders, is of strategic importance to the success or 
performance of any modern organization (Lusthau et al. 2002). Effective 
governance requires interactive and constant two-way communication between 
ministries overseeing the negotiation of international commitments and 
ministries in charge of implementing these commitments. During this process, 
government organizations and other key stakeholders attempt to resolve 
conflicts of interest and discuss and address policy issues in a timely manner. As 
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shown in the Figure above, the process of governance at the national level 
requires improved coordination not only in a horizontal institutional sense (e.g., 
across ministries and numerous inter-ministerial committees) but also vertically 
(e.g., across levels of government and social groups) (Pech 2010).  
Another key challenge is to harmonize existing national legislation and policies 
and to ensure strict adherence to these legal and policy requirements (Pech, 
2010). In all Mekong Region (MR) countries, the evolution of water and related 
resource legislation and policies can be traced from early resource exploitation 
legislation to more recent legislation (Pech, 2010). Many of the provisions 
relating to natural resource conservation, pollution control and protection of 
historical and cultural sites are scattered among a wide range of statutes and, in 
some instances, developed at different times and in vastly different political, 
economic and social contexts (Oliver et al. 2006). The existence of different 
legislation and laws based on sectoral responsibilities requires an evaluation of 
and solutions to a number of legal problems related to overlapping powers and 
functions, shared institutional duties, inconsistencies, and conflicting 
jurisdictions and legal provisions (Pech, 2010). 
To address institutional inconsistencies and conflicting jurisdictional 
responsibilities requires strong political support and commitment from the 
highest levels of government.  This can be achieved through increased 
awareness of the importance of change, with clear declaration of environmental 
objectives and policies and a definition of common procedural principles for 
environmental decision-making applicable to all sectors (Pech, 2010). A lack of 
resources and a tradition of cross-sectoral and vertical coordination may limit 
Cambodia’s ability to incorporate all of these issues and sectoral interests into 
this process. The experience of other developed countries demonstrates that 
certain characteristics are likely to promote an effective and successful decision-
making and coordination process (UNITAR, 2001). An effective risk 
management decision-making process could include:  
 Participatory: National position-making and strategies should be 
developed and implemented in consultation with a wide range of 
interested and affected parties; 
 Informed: Decision-making requires various types of information and 
thus often calls for efforts to access and review a wide range of 
information sources; and 
 Cyclical/iterative: An iterative approach will help to ensure that 
strategies remain up to date with evolving national policies and 
priorities and new scientific findings or technological developments, and 
help ensure that strategies take into account the results of systematic 
monitoring and evaluation of existing strategies and policies. 
The results of an analysis of the Mekong River Basin (MRB) ecological system and 
modern history (see Pech et al. 2007) suggests that, when a country is highly 
dependent on a complex and poorly understood ecosystem, development should 
be cross-cutting (incorporate various sectors and disciplines), integrated, 
precautionary, and supportive enough to sustain livelihoods in the region. 
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Asymmetry in causal responsibility and externality and asymmetry in capacity, 
require design principles that properly address the issues of monitoring and 
accountability, equity, and strengthened institutional and financial capacity (Pech, 
et al. 2007). Both ‘pro-dam’ and ‘anti-dam’ groups in the MR agree that their 
assessments on the positive and negative impacts of dam projects are limited by 
lack of adequate information, since access to data is limited, even among different 
government agencies within a single country. Moreover, there is no evidence that 
strategic and accumulative impact assessments and monitoring have been 
conducted in a wider context (Plinston and He, 2000, Pech and Sunda, Tonle Sap, 
2006). 
The MR requires mechanisms that will increase the benefits of compliance and/or 
raise the costs of non-compliance. Linking institutional arrangements together 
(MRC and GMS) can raise the price of non-compliance by increasing the probability 
that consequences of violations in one issue area will result in less cooperation in 
areas of importance to individual actors (Sadoff and Grey, 2003). Monitoring 
mechanisms, strategies and frameworks to encourage implementation and 
compliance are required and generally involve both state and non-state activities 
focused on achieving the goals and objectives of the treaty regime. Such 
mechanisms require an agreed-upon baseline and methods for verification 
established in a transparent and participatory manner. In addition, the quality of 
requirements is crucial, as compliance with dysfunctional regime rules will not 
improve outcomes. 
In spite of its deficiencies, the 1995 Mekong Agreement, which established the 
Mekong River Commission and outlined a legal framework for sustainable 
management of the MRB.  This agreement provides a useful point of reference for 
the analysis of agreed-upon rules and procedures and “soft-law” documents 
among key MR players whose activities are guided by the rules of the institutions 
in which they participate (Young, 2000). Within the processes of the MRC and 
GMS, some commonly accepted principles have gradually developed, such as an 
emphasis on equality and mutual respect, consensus building and consultation, all 
of which can play a catalytic role in shaping common ground rules. Furthermore, 
the performance and effectiveness of this agreement depends on the success in 
overcoming current major bottlenecks, which inhibit cooperation and coordination 
due to negative focal relations at both the local national and regional levels. Much 
work remains to be done in moving from the current lack of horizontal 
coordination between key ministries and vertical coordination between various 
levels of government (central, provincial and local). Finally, as shown by the MRC 
Upper Mekong Commercial Navigation Channel Improvement Project (UMNCIP) 
test case, high levels of transparency can deter actors from violating rules, even 
when there are substantial gains to be reaped from non-compliance and when 
enforcement mechanisms are poorly developed. 
Local communities in Cambodia require institutions that facilitate debate among 
government and non-government groups, policy makers and other stakeholders, 
highlighting multiple interests and positions of power. Power asymmetries are 
highly visible in the region, so much so that the current framework has been 
forced to stretch beyond its role as facilitator of public debates, assuming the more 
proactive role of negotiation on behalf of the powerless and helping to articulate 
their concerns and needs as demands (IUCN, TEI, IWMI, M-POWER, 2006). As a 
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multi-stakeholder dialogue, the Mekong Regional Waters Dialogue can be further 
institutionalized to provide a Mekong regional dialogue for state, non-state and 
business actors to inform and to be informed, to assess national and regional water 
resources development strategies. It can also be used to enable the articulation of 
different perspectives about Mekong water-related development for consideration 
during decision-making processes (Pech, Sunada, Oishi, 2007). 
The establishment of such a unified regional cooperation mechanism, supported 
by an agreed-upon analytical framework, harmonization of policy targets, 
evaluation tools, benefit distribution, impact mitigation and compensation 
strategies, would require a considerable amount of time (Bird, 2004; World Bank 
and ADB, 2006). Clearly, improved partnerships among key regional bodies 
connected to the MRB must go hand-in-hand with the promotion of meaningful 
multi-stakeholder dialogue among government and non-government groups, 
policy makers and other stakeholders to enable the articulation of different 
perspectives about Mekong water-related development. A mechanism 
ultimately enabling key actors to understand and interpret the real needs of MR 
communities is also essential (IUCN, TEI, IWMI, M-POWER, 2006). 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
The process of selecting and convening members for the MSP, a forum of key 
players in the water and related sectors in the Stung Pursat has been completed. The 
first MSP meeting held on 24-25 January, 2013 in Pursat, officially established the 
Pursat MSP, and set the tone for the entire MSP. The project team developed the 
Stakeholder Analysis Report, which laid the grounds for identifying areas for further 
research (including this power relation, conflict analysis, and principle document) 
under the Components 2 and 3 of the project. This report identifies how existing 
power relationship structures influence stakeholder participation in IWRM (and 
MSP) in terms of gaps, overlaps and power inequities. 
Jurisdictional overlaps exist amongst various line ministries in coordination, 
cooperation and control at the provincial and district levels. It affects the way in 
which the provincial governor and his office, river basin organizations or 
committees, FWUCs, etc. participate in decision-making around shared water 
resources. A clear delegation of authority across administrative boundaries (sub-
national administrative arrangements as opposed to hydrological boundaries) is 
required for full participation to occur. 
The government is undertaking decentralisation reforms to devolve power to 
semi-autonomous elected governments at the commune and sangkat (urban 
commune) level, and to move towards enhanced roles for provinces and 
municipalities as deconcentrated entities of the centre. Hence, it is important to 
understand that the current governmental structure at the provincial and district 
level is in flux: new processes and procedures are currently being put into place. 
While the benefits of decentralization are clear by increasing the involvement of 
local governments and communities’ in local natural resources planning and 
management, the devolution of authority over resources increases the risk of 
actions in one district, commune or village impacting others. Ensuring 
appropriate participation demands the establishment of a structure that involves 
all stakeholders in the catchment.  
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The village is the lowest level of government structure in Cambodia. Villages are 
an administrative arm of the commune, district, province and MOI. Discussion 
has taken place on the change in rules and regulations that should authorize 
commune councils to appoint a village chief, who acts as the main conduit of 
information and communication between the council, including council 
committees, and the village. Capacity within the line ministries in the sub-
national level offices (provincial and district) is generally quite low.  
The principal finding of this paper confirms that the level of cooperation from 
the local to the international level hinges on implementing effective planning 
and coordination structures, and elimination of negative focal relations at both 
national and regional levels. The effectiveness and efficiency of MRB regimes can 
be improved by increasing the level of connectedness and cooperation, starting at 
the local level and eventually continuing to the regional cooperation mechanisms 
among governments and non-state stakeholders. Community-based resource user 
groups (i.e. FWUCs, fisheries communities, and forestry communities) require 
consistent sources of funding and support to maintain sustainable contributions to 
IWRM. Time and effort may be required in order to affect a change in perception 
which will allow CSOs and Line Ministries to work more closely with each other 
and in order that CSOs achieve more influence.  
After improving its regional environmental governance, Cambodia, the weakest 
and most vulnerable MR country, should be able to better address its internal 
problems and derive benefits from regional economic cooperation. However, 
because Cambodian government officials are not in a position to challenge the 
potentially negative impacts of large development projects spearheaded by 
upstream countries (particularly China) without losing financial assistance, the 
local community in Cambodia needs a multi-stakeholder dialogue that can 
facilitate debate among government and non-government groups, policy makers 
and other stakeholders, highlighting the multiple interests and positions of 
power. Power asymmetries have become so visible in the region that civil society 
organizations are now required to move beyond their traditional role as 
facilitators of public debate and help powerless citizens translate their concerns 
and needs into demands that can then be delivered to policy makers. 
Institutionalized MSP can provide a space for: minimizing and resolving 
potential conflicts surrounding water resources development; for various actors 
to inform and to be informed; to assess water resource development strategies, 
and to enable the articulation of differing perspectives about development under 
consideration.  
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